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Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH; SALT LAKE
COUNTY ASSESSOR, ROBERT
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COUNTY TREASURER, ARTHUR
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]
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]
)

Defendants/Appellants.

Defendants/Appellants by their attorney, Mary Ellen Sloan,
submit the following Reply Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT TAX OBLIGATIONS ARE NOT
DISCHARGED UNTIL PAID.
Tax obligations are not discharged until paid and the vehicle
to collect tax obligations originally omitted is the escaped
property statute.

Its purpose is to allow for the correction of

the omission of taxing officers in previous years. "No statute of
limitations runs against the state, and

it

is a matter of

discretion with it to determine how far into the past it will reach
to compel performance of a taxpayer's obligation.

The owner of

taxable property omitted from the tax rolls becomes liable for the
1

tax thereon at the time the property ought to have been placed upon
the rolls, and this liability continues until the tax is discharged
by payment.

The completion of the tax roll for a given year

creates no vested right in the owners of property subject to
taxation that the assessment shall not thereafter be modified or
amended to their detriment.

The legislature may constitutionally

provide for the assessment of previously omitted property as well
as for the revaluation of property previously assessed." State and
Local Taxation, 72 Am Jur.2d §788 (citations omitted).
The purpose of the escaped property statute as noted above
must be viewed against the backdrop of public policy and the
necessity for the collection of tax revenue.

In Robinson v.

Hansen, 282 P. 782 (Utah 1929), this policy and interest were
articulated as follows:
It is a recognized principle of law that taxes
for general government purposes, lawfully
imposed by the state, are paramount to all
other demands against the taxpayer, although
the statute imposing the tax does not
expressly declare such priority. This rule
rests upon public policy and necessity. Civil
government cannot exist or be maintained
without revenues, and taxes levied by the
state for its support are founded upon a
higher obligation than other demands. It is
essential to the dignity and power of the
sovereign state that taxes levied by it be
promptly collected without fail.
Id., 282 P. at 783
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Appellee posits the general
rule that the County cannot retroactively collect additional taxes.
The

first

case

it cites

is Crystal

Car Line v.

State Tax

Commission, 174 P.2d 984, 987 (Utah 1946). The issue was whether

it was proper to assess railroad cars as personal property and to
enforce collection through seizure and sale of the property as
provided under the laws then in effect.

The case has no

application to escaped assessments or unlawfully received tax
exemptions.
The second case relied on is County Board of Equalization v.
State Tax Commission, ex.rel. Sunkist Service Co., 789 P.2d 291,
293

(Utah 1990),

for the general rule that

"where a valid

assessment has been made by an assessor cognizant of the facts,
undervaluation is ordinarily not a ground for another assessment."
This rule actually proves Appellants' point.
assessment

was not made when Appellee's

Since a valid

commercial

property

received a residential exemption Sunkist allows collection as an
escaped assessment.

The assessor was not aware of the error in

assessment until 1990.
Finally, First Security unashamedly admits it is not entitled
to a residential exemption but it is nevertheless entitled to a tax
refund for the mistakenly received exemption. The rule which First
Security urges this Court to adopt is "when such an exemption was
applied to the property through no fault of the taxpayer, and the
assessed taxes were paid, the County is precluded from going back
in later years to collect additional money."
p.9.

Appellee's Brief,

If adopted, this rule would extend beyond assessment errors

related to exemptions. It effectively would mean that once the tax
is paid, any assessment error which is to the taxpayer's benefit
cannot be collected as an escaped assessment.
3

To adopt this rule of law, would require the Court to overrule
Sunkist and would effectively eviscerate the escaped property
statute.
Finally, the parties each contend that the rules of statutory
construction favor it. The County contends that since Appellee is
essentially seeking a property tax exemption it should first show
its entitlement

and

the

escaped

property

statute

should

be

construed against the taxpayer seeking an exemption from taxation.
The Appellee takes the opposite stance and cites County Board of
Equalization v. Nupetco Associates. 119 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1989),
quoting from Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 450 P.2d
97, 99 (Utah 1969), to support is position.

In Cockayne the Court

upheld

$3,141.52

an

escaped

assessment

totalling

against

a

corporation even though $269.26 in taxes had originally been
assessed against the corporation's president and had been paid.
While arguing the escaped property statute must be construed
favorably to the taxpayer,

Appellee quotes only a portion of the

Cockayne decision and omits the language construing the escaped
property statute favorably to the taxing entity. The full text is
as follows:
We have made the observations in this opinion
and have arrived at our conclusion in
awareness that statutes imposing taxes and
prescribing tax procedures should generally be
construed favorably to the taxpayer and
strictly against the taxing authority. Such
rules,
though
salutary
in
proper
circumstances, should not be so applied as to
defeat or obstruct the correct operation and
the application of taxing procedures.
The
payment of taxes is burdensome. But the means
of relief is not to be found in allowing some
4

taxpayers to slip by without paying their fair
share and thus putting an even greater burden
on others.
As in Cockavne, the Court should not construe the escaped
property statute so as to let First Security slip by without paying
its fair share and putting an even greater burden on other
taxpayers.
POINT II
THE PROPERTY ESCAPED ASSESSMENT.
Appellee's next argument is that the escaped property
statute enacted in 1989 with an effective date of January 1, 1990,
should apply retroactively to 1985 as opposed to the escaped
property statute in effect during the years the property actually
escaped assessment. The County utilized the statute in effect for
the years subject to assessment i.e. 1985 through 1988.

In doing

so, the County acted consistently since it used the tax rates in
effect for those years as opposed to the 1990 tax rates.
Retroactive

legislation

are

"acts

which

operate

on

transactions which have occurred or rights and obligations which
existed

before

Construction,

passage
Sands

4th

of the
Ed.,

act."
Vol.

2,

Sutherland,
§41.01.

Statutory

Retroactive

legislation is generally disfavored and is not to be construed as
retroactive unless the legislature expressly provides for it.
Retrospective operation is not favored by the
Courts, however, and a law will not be
construed as retroactive unless the act
clearly, by express language or necessary
implication,
indicates
the
legislature
intended a retroactive application.
Id., §41.04 at 348.
5

In this instance the escaped property

statute expressly

provided the effective date of the act as January 1, 1990. Other
evidence it was not intended to apply retroactively is that the
version of §59-2-309 which became effective on January 1, 1990, did
not repeal the escaped property statute (§59-2-309) in effect prior
thereto.

"Failure of an act to repeal a prior statutory provision

on the same subject is evidence of a legislative purpose that the
new act not apply retroactively,"

Id.. §41.04 at 350.

Finally, it is fair to Appellee to apply the 1989 version of
the escaped property statute since it would have undoubtedly
applied if the assessment error had been noticed and asserted in
1989 as opposed to one year later.
The County has drawn the Court's attention to the case of
General Dynamics Corp. v. County of San Diego, 166 Cal. Rptr. 310
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980) for the general rule that

"an escaped

assessment is levied according to the laws existing in the fiscal
year

in which

the under-assessment

occurred,"

Id.,

at 314.

Appellee asserts the County "misread" the case but then admits the
Court refused to apply a law which became effective in 1974 to an
escaped assessment made in 1974 for tax year 1972. It applied the
law in effect in 1972.

Instead of distinguishing the case the

Appellee's argument illustrates the factual and legal similarity
between General Dynamics and this matter.

Further, the County

relied on General Dynamics as authority for the rule that the
constitutional

requirements

of

uniformity

and

equality

in

assessments provide authority to collect the tax if the escaped
property statute does not.
6

There is no Utah Supreme Court case on point, i.e. whether a
mistakenly

applied exemption

can be collected

as an escaped

assessment. However, Appellee argues that even if the 1990 version
of the escaped property statute does not apply, under the law as
decided in the case of County Board of Equalization v. Nupetco
Associates, 779 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1989), the property is not subject
to escaped assessment. The language of the Court is instructive in
determining whether property has escaped assessment or is merely
undervalued.

It stated as follows:
The mistake in the acreage figure
resulted in an undervaluation of the
assessed property, not in an escape from
assessment within the meaning of the
statute.
The property was assessed,
albeit inaccurately.
The statute does
not permit retroactive correction of
mistaken valuations after the tax has
been paid.

Id., 779 P.2d at 1139.
From Nupetco and Sunkist two rules emerge.

First, if

property is undervalued the escaped assessment statute can not be
used to alter the valuation.

Secondly, improvements which are

completely omitted from assessment can be assessed retroactively as
an escaped assessment.
point.

Neither of these cases are directly on

The property wasn't undervalued because the full market

value is reflected on the tax notice and the improvements have not
been omitted or even under assessed.
Since neither of the foregoing cases address this factual
situation, neither would be overruled if this Court finds in favor
of Appellants. Because Utah hasn't decided this issue, Appellants
7

have cited decisions from other jurisdictions which upheld the use
of escaped assessment statutes to collect a tax attributable to an
improperly received exemption.
Appellees attempt to distinguish the cases cited by the County
ignores certain underlying premises of each.

Like the matter

before this Court, Freiahtliner Corp. v. Department of Revenue. 549
P.2d 662 (Ore. 1976) and Cherry Hill Industrial Properties v.
Township of Voorhees. 452 A.2d 673 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Dir. 1982)
addressed whether escaped or omitted property statutes could be
used to collect additional taxes due to a mistakenly allowed
property tax exemption.
Both Freiahtliner and Cherry Hill held that property which is
not legally entitled to a tax exemption, is subject to retroactive
collection of the tax attributable to the exemption.

Appellee

considers Freiahtliner distinguishable because Oregon/s omitted
property statute recognized that property which has been omitted in
part may be assessed as an escaped assessment. An argument can be
made that Appellee's property was wholly omitted because it was
assessed as residential property instead of as commercial property.
In other words, a mistaken residential exemption doesn't constitute
a partial omission of assessment but rather a complete omission of
assessment of the property's status under law.
Also, Appellee attempts to distinguish Cherry Hill Industrial
Properties primarily on the grounds the taxpayer failed to file
required forms to qualify for the exemption and hence under Utah's
1990 version of the escaped property statute the property would be
subject to retroactive tax collection.
8

Nothing in Cherry Hill

suggests that New Jersey had such a provision so as to allow for
the escaped assessment.

In fact, the very argument asserted by

Appellee that property can't be subject to escaped assessment
unless it is wholly omitted was rejected by the Court.

In both

General Dynamics and Cherry Hill Indus. Properties the Court held
that

exemptions

which

resulted

in

underassessment

could

be

withdrawn and retroactively assessed.
Also, Sunkist doesn't stand for the broad proposition Appellee
asserts, i.e. that underassessed property can't be subject to
escaped assessment since the Court's reference to underassessment
was dicta.

This is apparent from Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt

Lake County. 799 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1990), decided in pari materia
with Sunkist.

The County argued it could assert an escaped

assessment against Kennecott's property because the method for
valuing

the

property

resulted

in

an

unconstitutional

underassessment. Although not deciding the issue because the facts
were not before it, the Court's statement is instructive in the
proper interpretation of Sunkist:
To justify a reassessment under §59-5-17, the
County must be able to show that unassessed or
underassessed property 'escaped assessment'
and was not just 'undervalued'.
* * *

The specific facts of this case, when proved,
may be determinative of whether an incorrect
assessment, ...results in an undervaluation or
an escaped assessment, (emphasis added)
Id.. 799 P.2d at 1162-63.
What the Court has distinguished in the foregoing is the
difference in undervaluation of property and property which is
9

unassessed or underassessed. Undervaluation of property is not to
be corrected as an escaped assessment; but property which is
unassessed or underassessed may be so corrected.
POINT III
THE CONSTITUTION MANDATES CORRECTION OF THE
ERROR IN ASSESSMENT.
First Security admits that if the legislature had passed a law
which

gave

it

the

residential

exemption

the

law

would

be

unconstitutional. Appellee's Brief, p. 21. Because the foregoing
premise is accepted one must conclude the County's assessment was
a de facto violation of the constitution.
This position presents the anomalous situation that although
the assessment violates the constitution, the Appellee contends the
escaped

property

statute

nonetheless

bars

correction

of the

unconstitutional assessment. However, under the authority of Salt
Lake County v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah. 780 P.2d 1231
(Utah 1989), if the escaped property statute is applied to bar the
correction of an unconstitutional assessment, such an application
would be unconstitutional.
Appellee further argues that Nupetco would be overruled if the
Appellants' argument is accepted. However, Nupetco did not present
an assessment error wherein commercial property was de facto
classified

as residential

property.

Further,

accepting

the

County's argument does not mean that the escaped property statute
is unconstitutional "because it limits retroactive assessment to
just five years". Appellee's Brief, p. 21. The escaped property
statute is constitutional on its face and in fact promotes equality
10

and uniformity if applied to correct assessment errors.

But when

an error occurs, which effectively creates a misclassification of
property, application of the escaped property statute to bar
correction of the classification error is unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request
this Court reverse the decision of the Trial Court and enter
judgment for Appellants.
DATED this

V7

day of January, 1993.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

MARY ELLEN SLOAN
Deputy County Attorney

fsbrief.cw
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